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Abstract 
 
This article examines the interaction among capital flows, money supply and 
property prices with a focus of Chinese economy by using a vector auto-regression (VAR) 
estimation as an analytical framework. The key research questions were, first, whether 
money supply has been determined independently from capital flows, and then which 
factor, capital flows or money supply, has given a dominant effect on property prices. The 
contributions of this study are to investigate the impacts on property prices jointly from 
capital flows as an external factor and from money supply as a domestic factor, and to 
count on the differences in the trends in property prices of seventy regional cities in China. 
The main findings through the VAR estimations were as follows. First, domestic money 
supply has been determined exclusively from external capital flows through the 
authority’s perfect sterilization of foreign-exchange-market intervention. Second, the 
main contributor to property prices’ movement has been domestic money supply rather 
than external capital flows. Third, some deviations of property prices from the trend in 
money supply were found in big cities and/or coastal advanced cities. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Asset prices have become a serious target of macroeconomic policies in emerging 
market economies as well as advanced economies.1 In particular, it has been a critical 
concern for policy makers and academic circles to prevent and address the boom-bust 
cycle of asset bubbles. The 2008 global financial crisis was a typical example of the 
product of asset bubbles in the United States. China is not an exception to care about asset 
prices since Chinese economy has also experienced some large fluctuations in its property 
prices and stock prices since the 2000s. 
When it comes to the issue on the determinants of asset prices, it is often pointed out 
that massive capital flows in the global financial markets have accelerated the fluctuation 
of asset prices, particularly, in emerging market economies. Large capital inflows, for 
instance, may lead to excessive foreign borrowing, possibly fueling domestic credit 
booms and asset bubbles. Once capital flows reverse suddenly, however, a boom stage of 
credit expansion and asset price hikes may be turned into a bust stage, and the economies 
may finally suffer from serious financial and economic crisis. 
The monetary authorities in emerging market economies, facing capital flows, 
usually intervenes in the foreign exchange market regardless of their currency regimes to 
avoid their currency fluctuations. Whether the authority sterilizes the intervention for 
shutting off the impacts of capital flows on domestic monetary market leads to different 
stories on the influenced asset prices. In case that the intervention is not fully sterilized, 
it accommodates an increase in money supply, which affects asset prices as an indirect 
impact of capital flows. When the authority sterilizes the intervention perfectly, the 
money supply managed by the authority could be a factor independent from capital flows 
to influence asset prices. 
It would be significant, therefore, to investigate the channel in which asset prices are 
affected by capital flows and/or money supply. In this context, China could be a good 
analytical example, since her economy has experienced the fluctuations of asset prices 
and capital flows, which have required sophisticated management of money supply by 
the authority. 
This article examines the interaction among capital flows, money supply and 
property prices with a focus of Chinese economy by using a vector auto-regression (VAR) 
estimation as an analytical framework. Our research questions are: whether the 
                                                   
1 For instance, Blanchard et al. (2010) argued in their conclusion that policymakers have to watch 
many targets, including the composition of output, the behavior of asset prices, and the leverage of 
different agents. 
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sterilization of the intervention has been conducted for shutting off the impacts of capital 
flows on domestic money supply, and which factor, capital flows or money supply, has 
given a dominant effect on property prices. The contributions of this study are that the 
determinants of asset prices are investigated jointly from capital flows as an external 
factor and from money supply as a domestic factor, whereas the determinant was usually 
examined separately in most of the literature. Another contribution is that the study 
focuses on property prices as a representative of asset prices and takes into account the 
differences in the trends in property prices of seventy regional cities in China. 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 clarifies a theoretical 
framework on the interaction among capital flows, money supply and asset prices. Section 
3 describes the literature review focusing mainly on the determinants of asset prices in 
the case of Chinese economy. Section 4 conducts a VAR estimation on the interaction 
among capital flows, money supply and property prices targeting seventy regional cities 
in China. The section proceeds with the descriptions of data, methodologies and 
estimation outcomes with its interpretation. The last section summarizes and concludes. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
 
This section clarifies a theoretical framework on the interaction among capital flows, 
money supply and asset prices. We suppose that asset prices are affected by capital flows 
as an external factor and by money supply as a domestic factor. 
Regarding the impacts of capital flows on asset prices, Caballero and Krishnamurthy 
(2006) provided theoretical insights on the nexus between capital inflows and asset 
bubbles in emerging market economies. They argued that emerging market economies 
present a fertile macroeconomic environment for the emergence of asset bubbles 
dynamics, since a shortage of stores of value, i.e. dynamic inefficiency, caused by the 
“financial repression” in their financial systems tends to create a space for bubbles on 
unproductive assets to arise. 
As Kim and Yang (2009) and Taguchi et al. (2005) described, there are two kinds of 
channels in which asset prices are affected by capital flows. One channel is that capital 
flows can directly affect the demand for assets, which can thus influence asset prices. For 
example, capital inflows to the stock market increase the demand for stocks, thereby 
causing the stock price hike. Another channel is an indirect one through a change in 
money supply. Whether this channel works or not, however, depends on the degree of 
monetary autonomy of the authority facing capital flows. The authority with full 
autonomy can manage money supply independently from any capital flows. 
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In general, an economy cannot avoid the constraint of “impossible trinity” trinity”: 
an economy should pursue two of three options – fixed exchange rates, independent 
monetary policy and free capital flows (see Diagram 1). Thus, an economy has to give up 
fixed exchange rate or capital mobility to secure monetary autonomy. When we focus on 
currency regime, an economy with perfect “floating” regime does not intervene in its 
foreign exchange market. Even if the economy faces capital flows, therefore, nothing 
happens in its domestic money supply. On the contrary, a monetary authority with 
“pegged” regime under free capital flows cannot help intervening in its foreign exchange 
market, resulting in a change in foreign reserves and money supply. Thus, capital flows 
would affect asset prices through a change in money supply as an indirect channel. 
 
<Diagram 1> 
 
The monetary authority in emerging market and developing economies usually 
intervenes in their foreign exchange market to a greater or less extent to avoid their 
currency-value fluctuations, since they are basically facing the problem of “fear of 
floating” suggested by Calvo and Reinhart (2002). Then the key question in their 
economies is whether the authority “sterilizes” the intervention in foreign exchange 
market to regain its monetary autonomy. If the economies allow some changes in their 
currency value (e.g. under “managed floating” regime) and/or adopt “capital control”, 
monetary autonomy would be guaranteed by the sterilization in a greater or less degree. 
In this case, capital flows do not always affect money supply, and an indirect channel 
from capital flows to asset prices does not necessarily work. 
When we focus on the case of China, its economy may have some monetary 
autonomy for the following reasons. First, foreign capital flows have been still regulated 
to a greater extent in China. According to the Chinn-Ito index (KAOPEN) 2, an index 
measuring a country's degree of capital account openness, China ranked 158th out of 174 
countries in 2014. Thus, the strict capital control might have guaranteed independent 
monetary policy in China. Second, China has reformed its currency regime into a 
managed floating one since July in 2005, and under this regime, the value of renminbi 
has appreciated by around thirty percent from 2005 to 2015. This increasing flexibility of 
exchange rate might also have allowed monetary autonomy in China. 
In this context, the research questions on the interaction among capital flows, money 
supply and asset (property) prices in China are, first, whether the money supply has been 
                                                   
2 See the website: http://web.pdx.edu/~ito/Chinn-Ito_website.htm. As for the data source, refer to 
Chinn and Ito (2006). 
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determined independently from capital flows, in other words, whether the sterilization of 
foreign-exchange-market intervention has worked fully enough to cut off the impacts of 
capital flows on money supply. In case that money supply and capital flows have an 
exclusive relationship, there comes the second question: which factor, capital flows 
through a direct channel or money supply that is domestically determined, has had a major 
impact on asset (property) prices. 
 
3. Literature Review and Contribution 
 
This section reviews the literature focusing mainly on the determinants of asset prices 
in the case of Asian emerging market and Chinese economy. 
Regarding the studies targeting Asian emerging market economies, Kim and Yang 
(2011) investigated the effects of capital inflows on stock and land prices by employing 
a panel VAR model with the samples of South Korea, Malaysia, Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. Their empirical results suggested that capital inflows indeed contributed to 
the asset price appreciation in this region, although capital inflow shocks explained a 
relatively small part of asset price fluctuations. Tillmann (2012) also estimated the 
impacts of capital inflows on house prices and equity prices by a panel VAR model with 
the samples of Korea, Hong Kong, Malaysia, Thailand and Taiwan. The study found that 
capital inflow shocks pushed up house and stock prices in general, and at the same time 
identified cross-country differences in asset price responses to capital flow shocks. The 
key finding in this study was that the differences in the asset price responses were mainly 
due to the differences in the monetary policy responses to the capital flow shocks. 
There have also been limited but several studies on the interaction among capital 
flows, money supply and asset prices in the case of Chinese economy. In the combination 
between capital flows and asset prices, Deng (2010) verified that the “hot money” flowed 
into real estate rather than equity market and thus had an effect to push up housing prices. 
Wang et al. (2007) argued, on the contrary, that foreign money inflow was not the cause 
of real estate price rising and its price rising caused capital inflows on the contrary based 
on Granger causality tests, although they identified a long-term equilibrium between both 
variables through co-integration tests. As for the relationship between monetary policy 
and asset prices, Koivu (2012) found that a loosening of China’s monetary policy led to 
higher asset prices through structural vector autoregressive estimation. On the other hand, 
Yao et al. (2013) pointed out that monetary policies had little immediate effect based on 
vector autoregressive estimation and attributed the outcome to irrational and speculative 
behaviors of Chinese investors. In this way, the empirical evidence has been inconclusive 
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in each of bilateral combination analysis. Xu and Chen (2012) examined jointly the 
impacts of capital flows and monetary policies on asset prices. They demonstrated that 
Chinese monetary policy actions were the key driving forces behind the change in real 
estate price growth in China. They also showed that hot money flow did not have a 
significant impact on the change in home price growth after controlling for the money 
supply growth. 
This study contributes to enriching empirical evidence on the determinants of asset 
prices by examining them jointly from capital flows as an external factor and from money 
supply as a domestic factor, whereas the determinant was usually investigated separately 
in most of the literature. Another contribution is that the study focuses on property prices 
as a representative of asset prices and takes into account the heterogeneity in the trends 
in property prices of seventy regional cities in China, while most of the literature cared 
only about the nationwide trend in property prices.  
 
4. Empirics 
 
This section conducts the empirics on the interaction among capital flows, money 
supply and property prices in China through Granger causality test under VAR estimation. 
We first examine the combination between capital flows and money supply in Subsection 
4.1, i.e., whether the money supply has been determined independently from capital flows. 
Then we next investigate which factor, capital flows or money supply, has had a major 
impact on property prices in Subsection 4.2. The causalities are examined on property 
prices for each of individual regional cities and for total panel of all cities. Through the 
subsections, the study samples the period from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth 
quarter of 2016 due to the data availability of property prices. All the data are retrieved 
from National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBSC) and the People’s Bank of China 
(PBC).3 
 
4.1 Relationship between Capital Flows and Money Supply 
 
This subsection focuses the relationship between capital flows and money supply in 
China. We first specify each variable as follows. The capital flows (cif) are shown by 
                                                   
3 The data of money supply are taken from PBC, and the other data are from NBSC. The websites are 
as follows. 
PBC: http://www.pbc.gov.cn/diaochatongjisi/116219/index.html 
NBSC: http://data.stats.gov.cn/english 
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“Liabilities” of “Financial account” in China’s balance of payments. This item contains 
all the liabilities in terms of direct investment, portfolio investment, financial derivatives 
and other investment (e.g. bank loans). For the estimation, the capital flows are expressed 
by a percentage of GDP. Money supply (mon) is represented by M1, which reflects 
monetary policy stances of the authority. The money supply is expressed by year-on-year 
comparison rate to remove its seasonable variation. We add the variable of GDP (gdp) as 
a control variable to extract purely bilateral effects between capital flows and money 
supply. The GDP is also expressed by year-on-year rate to remove its seasonable variation. 
Figure 1 displays the overviews of the relationship between capital flows and money 
supply. It appears by rough observation that there is no clear correlation between both 
variables. Since both variables might also be affected by the trend in GDP, the relationship 
should be statistically tested by a more sophisticated manner, i.e., a VAR estimation, by 
controlling the third variable of GDP. 
 
<Figure 1> 
 
Before specifying a VAR estimation, we investigate the stationary property of the 
data for each variable, by employing the Ng-Perron unit root test on the null hypothesis 
that each variable has a unit root in the test equation including “intercept” and one quarter 
lag.4 This test constructs four test statistics: modified forms of Phillips and Perron (1988) 
statistics (MZa, MZt), the Bhargava (1986) statistic (MSB), and the Point Optimal 
statistic (MPT). Table 1.1 reports the test results for the data for all three variables, i.e., 
capital flows (cif), money supply (mon) and GDP (gdp). The test rejected a unit root in 
all the data at the conventional level of significance by more than 90 percent, thereby their 
data showing stationary property. Thus their data were justified to be used for a VAR 
estimation. 
We now specify an equation for VAR estimation in the following way. 
 
𝑦𝑡 =  𝜇 +  𝑉𝑦𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡     (1) 
 
where 𝑦𝑡  is a column vector of the endogenous variables with year t, i.e., 𝑦𝑡 =
 (𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡)
′;  𝜇 is a constant vector; 𝑉 is a coefficient matrix; 𝑦𝑡−1 is a vector of the 
lagged endogenous variables; and 𝜀𝑡 is a vector of the random error terms in the system. 
The lag length (-1) is selected by the Schwarz information criterion with maximum lag 
                                                   
4 Ng and Perron (2001) introduced a new unit root test, which used detrended data and a lag selection 
procedure that improved on previous methods. 
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being equal to (-2) under the limited number of observations. We also insert GDP (gdp) 
in the equation to control the bilateral correlation between cif and mon. 
Based on the specification above, we conduct the VAR estimation (see Table 1.2) and 
then examine the Granger causality between capital flows (cif) and money supply (mon) 
(see Table 1.3). When we focus on the causality from capital flows to money supply, the 
causality was identified at the 99-percent significant level, but its sign was negative in the 
VAR estimation as shown in Table 1.2. This implied that when China has faced capital 
inflows, the authority has not allowed any monetary expansion, but even reduced money 
supply. In other words, the impacts of capital flows have been shut off from domestic 
money supply by more than 100 percent through the authority’s sterilization of foreign-
exchange-market intervention. 
 
<Table 1> 
 
4.2 Impacts of Capital Flows and/or Money Supply on Property Prices 
 
The previous section suggested that domestic money supply has been determined 
exclusively from external capital flows in China. However, capital flows may still have 
an effect on property prices through a direct channel as the theoretical framework in 
Section 2 presented. Then, which factor, capital flows or money supply, has had a 
dominant impact on property prices is the next question.  
We add a variable of property prices retrieved from NBSC. The property prices 
sample the data of two kinds: prices of newly constructed commercialized buildings 
(nccp) and prices of second-hand residential buildings (shrp); and the data of seventy 
selected cities in thirty provinces, in terms of year-on-year change rate. It is because the 
prices of two kinds in seventy cities show highly different movements during sample 
period form the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2016 in Figure 2. We also 
replace GDP (gdp) with gross regional products, GRP(grp), which seventy cities belong 
to, as a control variable. 
 
<Figure 2> 
 
We investigate the data property for property prices and GRP by the same 
methodology as the previous section’s one. The test results in Table 2 showed that the 
data were not stationary for some cities’ property prices and some provinces’ GRP: the 
prices of newly constructed commercialized buildings in Juning, the prices of second-
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hand residential buildings in Bengbu, Nanchang, Jiujiang, Zhanjiang, Zunyi and Xining, 
and the GRP in Anhui, Shandong and Guangxi. Thus we exclude these data from the 
following VAR estimation. 
 
<Table 2> 
 
We again specify an equation for VAR estimation in the same way as before. 
 
𝑦′𝑡 =  𝜇′ +  𝑉′𝑦′𝑡−1 +  𝜀′𝑡     (2) 
 
where 𝑦′𝑡  is a column vector of the endogenous variables with year t, i.e., 𝑦𝑡 =
 (𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡  𝑛𝑐𝑐𝑝𝑡)
′  and  (𝑐𝑖𝑓𝑡 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡  𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑝𝑡)
′ ;  𝜇′  is a constant vector; 𝑉′  is a 
coefficient matrix; 𝑦′𝑡−1 is a vector of the lagged endogenous variables; and 𝜀′𝑡 is a 
vector of the random error terms in the system. The lag length (-1) is selected by the same 
methodology as in previous section. We also insert GRP (grp) in the equation to control 
the correlations among capital flows, money supply and property prices. 
We then conduct the VAR estimation and examine the Granger causalities from 
capital flows and money supply to property prices. 5  Table 3 reports the results of 
causality tests as follows. The tests were conducted on 60 cities for the prices of newly 
constructed commercialized buildings (nccp) and on 55 cities for the prices of second-
hand residential buildings (shrp), by excluding the cities in which the data with 
nonstationary property was included out of total 70 cities. Regarding nccp, positive 
causalities from money supply to the property prices were identified at significant levels 
on 57 cities out of 60 cities, whereas those from capital flows to the property prices were 
verified only on one city. As for shrp, positive causalities from money supply to the 
property prices were identified at significant levels on 37 cities out of 55 cities, while 
those from capital flows to the property prices were verified only on 4 cities. These test 
results, therefore, suggested that the main contributor to property prices’ determinant was 
domestic money supply rather than external capital inflows. This outcome is also 
consistent with the previous study of Xu and Chen (2012). 
It should also be noted that some of cities where their property prices are not affected 
by money supply as well as capital flows belong to big cities and/or coastal advanced 
cities, e.g. Shanghai and Shenzhen in nccp; and Beijing, Changchun, Shanghai, Ningbo, 
Fuzhou, Guangzhou, Shaoguan and Shenzhen in shrp. In these cities, property prices 
                                                   
5 The results of VAR estimation in individual cities are not reported here to conserve space. 
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might be subject to investors’ speculations. Yao et al. (2013), again, argued that monetary 
policies had little effect on property prices since Chinese investors might be “irrational” 
and “speculative” in such a way that investors rushed to buy houses or shares whenever 
tightening monetary policies were taken. Although the authority is keeping its monetary 
autonomy, it may have a room to enhance the accountability and transparency of its 
monetary policies to minimize irrational behaviors of Chinese investors. 
 
<Table 3> 
 
Finally, we herein check the robustness of the individual city’s estimation above by 
conducting a panel VAR estimation. We construct a panel data with total seventy cities 
for the full sample period from the first quarter of 2007 to the fourth quarter of 2016 in 
the prices of newly constructed commercialized buildings (nccp) and those of second-
hand residential buildings (shrp). The data property was examined by the Levin, Lin and 
Chu unit root test developed by Levin et al. (2002), which assumes that the parameters of 
the series lagged are common across cross sections. The test result in Table 4.1 showed 
that all the data were stationary at the 99 percent significant level. We then replace the 
data in the equation (2) and conduct the panel VAR estimation with Granger causality test 
(see Table 4.2 and Table 4.3). The causality test reported that both of property prices, nccp 
and shrp, were caused negatively by capital flows and positively by money supply. From 
this panel VAR analysis, we could also confirm that the major determinant of property 
prices were domestic money supply in China. 
 
<Table 4> 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
This article examined the interaction among capital flows, money supply and 
property prices with a focus of Chinese economy by using a vector auto-regression (VAR) 
estimation as an analytical framework. Our research questions were, first, whether money 
supply has been determined independently from capital flows, and then which factor, 
capital flows or money supply, has given a dominant effect on property prices. The 
contributions of this study were that the determinants of asset prices were investigated 
jointly from capital flows as an external factor and from money supply as a domestic 
factor. Another contribution was that the study focused on property prices as a 
representative of asset prices and took into account the differences in the trends in 
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property prices of seventy regional cities in China. 
The main findings through the Granger causality tests by the VAR estimations were 
as follows. First, domestic money supply has been determined exclusively from external 
capital flows through the authority’s perfect sterilization of foreign-exchange-market 
intervention. Second, the main contributor to property prices’ movement has been 
domestic money supply rather than external capital flows. Third, some deviations of 
property prices from the trend in money supply were found in big cities and/or coastal 
advanced cities. The strategic implication of our findings is that although the monetary 
authority is keeping its autonomy, it may has a room to enhance the accountability and 
transparency of its monetary policies to minimize irrational behaviors of Chinese 
investors. 
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Diagram 1 Impossible Trinity 
 
Sources: Author’s description based on Mankiw (2007) 
 
Figure 1 Capital Flows and Money Supply 
 
Sources: NBSC and PBC 
  
0.0
5.0
10.0
15.0
20.0
25.0
30.0
35.0
-4.0
-2.0
0.0
2.0
4.0
6.0
8.0
10.0
12.0
2
0
0
7
:1
2
0
0
7
:3
2
0
0
8
:1
2
0
0
8
:3
2
0
0
9
:1
2
0
0
9
:3
2
0
1
0
:1
2
0
1
0
:3
2
0
1
1
:1
2
0
1
1
:3
2
0
1
2
:1
2
0
1
2
:3
2
0
1
3
:1
2
0
1
3
:3
2
0
1
4
:1
2
0
1
4
:3
2
0
1
5
:1
2
0
1
5
:3
2
0
1
6
:1
2
0
1
6
:3
Capital Flows Money Supply
14 
 
Table 1 Analysis of Correlation between Capital Flows and Money Supply 
 
Table 1.1 Unit Root Test 
 
Note: **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC and PBC 
 
Table 1.2 VAR Estimation 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance, 
respectively. The figure in parenthesis [ ] indicates t value. 
Sources: NBSC and PBC 
 
Table 1.3 Granger Causality Test 
 
Note: ***, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC and PBC 
 
  
   MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT
Capital Inflows cif -10.37 ** -2.26 ** 0.21 ** 2.40 **
Money Supply mon -11.60 ** -2.39 ** 0.20 ** 2.15 ** 
GDP gdp -10.32 * -2.21 ** 0.21 ** 2.57 **
cif mon
0.392 ** -0.577 **
[2.382] [-2.581]
0.091 * 1.011 ***
[1.761] [14.312]
-0.798 3.737 ***
[-0.832] [2.869]
0.159 -0.102
[1.512] [-0.714]
adj. R^2 0.530 0.862
cif -1
mon -1
gdp
C
Null Hypothesis Lags Chi-sq
 cif  does not Granger Cause mon 1 6.66 *** (negative)
 mon  does not Granger Cause cif 1 3.10 * (positive)
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Figure 2 Trends in Property Prices in Selected 5 Cities 
 
[Prices of Newly Constructed Commercialized Buildings] 
 
 
[Prices of Second-Hand Residential Buildings] 
 
Sources: NBSC 
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Table 2 Unit Root Test of Property Prices and GRP 
 
[Prices of Newly Constructed Commercialized Buildings] 
 
 
  
nccp    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT
Beijing pbei -108.78 *** -7.30 *** 0.06 *** 0.34 ***
Tianjin ptia -48.53 *** -4.76 *** 0.09 *** 0.91 ***
Shijiazhuang pshi -23.34 *** -3.34 *** 0.14 *** 1.29 ***
Tangshan ptan -9.02 ** -2.12 ** 0.23 * 2.72 **
Qinhuangdao pqin -48.46 *** -4.92 *** 0.10 *** 0.51 ***
Taiyuan ptai -56.36 *** -5.30 *** 0.09 *** 0.43 ***
Hohhot phoh -35.56 *** -4.21 *** 0.11 *** 0.68 ***
Baotou pbao -14.94 *** -2.70 *** 0.18 ** 1.74 ***
Shenyang pshe -45.51 *** -4.76 *** 0.10 *** 0.54 ***
Dalian pdal -11.35 ** -2.35 ** 0.20 ** 2.26 **
Dandong pdan -20.88 *** -3.22 *** 0.15 *** 1.19 ***
Jinzhou pjin -15.42 *** -2.72 *** 0.17 ** 1.79 **
Changchun pcha -11.24 ** -2.37 ** 0.21 ** 2.18 **
Jilin pjil -20.43 *** -3.19 *** 0.15 *** 1.19 ***
Harbin phar -28.43 *** -3.76 *** 0.13 *** 0.88 ***
Mudanjiang pmud -8.78 ** -2.00 ** 0.22 ** 3.12 **
Shanghai psha -1,007.55 *** -22.41 *** 0.02 *** 0.04 ***
Nanjing pnan -858.13 *** -20.65 *** 0.02 *** 0.06 ***
Wuxi pwux -240.84 *** -10 75 *** 0.04 *** 0.36 ***
Xuzhou pxuz -35.26 *** -4.18 *** 0.11 *** 0.74 ***
Yangzhou pyan -66.64 *** -5.72 *** 0.08 *** 0.46 ***
Hangzhou phan -42.80 *** -4.49 *** 0.10 *** 0.93 ***
Ningbo pnin -22.87 *** -3.36 *** 0.14 *** 1.14 ***
Wenzhou pwen -10.34 ** -2.27 ** 0.21 ** 2.37 **
Jinhua pjih -25.50 *** -3.55 *** 0.13 *** 1.00 ***
Hefei phef -305.29 *** -12.17 *** 0.03 *** 0.27 ***
Bengbu pben -45.18 *** -4.74 *** 0.10 *** 0.57 ***
Anqing panq -17.15 *** -2.92 *** 0.17 *** 1.44 ***
Fuzhou pfuz -16.12 *** -2.73 *** 0.16 *** 1.90 **
Xiamen pxia -55.95 *** -5.14 *** 0.09 *** 0.79 ***
Quanzhou pqua -24.40 *** -3.48 *** 0.14 *** 1.02 ***
Nanchang pnac -19.63 *** -3.10 *** 0.15 *** 1.34 ***
Jiujiang pjiu -19.32 *** -3.04 *** 0.15 *** 1.49 ***
Ganzhou pgan -8.65 ** -2.06 ** 0.23 * 2.87 **
Ji''Nan pjia -168.14 *** -9.02 *** 0.05 *** 0.35 ***
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[Continued] 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC 
 
  
nccp    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT
Qingdao pqig -50.23 *** -4.93 *** 0.09 *** 0.67 ***
Yantai pyat -8.55 ** -2.05 ** 0.23 * 2.92 **
Jining pjii -4.43 -1.41 0.31 5.64
Zhengzhou pzhe -57.94 *** -5.08 *** 0.08 *** 1.10 ***
Luoyang pluo -29.65 *** -3.84 *** 0.12 *** 0.83 ***
Pingdingshan ppin -37.76 *** -4.34 *** 0.11 *** 0.65 ***
Wuhan pwuh -142.68 *** -8.32 *** 0.05 *** 0.36 ***
Yichang pyic -25.78 *** -3.59 *** 0.13 *** 0.95 ***
Xiangfan pxig -10.32 ** -2.26 ** 0.21 ** 2.39 **
Changsha pchn -58.92 *** -5.37 *** 0.09 *** 0.53 ***
Yueyang pyue -8.74 ** -2.07 ** 0.23 * 2.85 **
Changde pchg -25.02 *** -3.53 *** 0.14 *** 0.98 ***
Guangzhou pgua -55.51 *** -5.21 *** 0.09 *** 0.56 ***
Shaoguan psho -20.80 *** -3.20 *** 0.15 *** 1.26 ***
Shenzhen pshn -30.20 *** -3.86 *** 0.12 *** 0.87 ***
Zhanjiang pzha -20.26 *** -3.18 *** 0.15 *** 1.21 ***
Huizhou phui -12.37 ** -2.45 ** 0.19 ** 2.10 **
Nanning pnai -21.14 *** -3.24 *** 0.15 *** 1.17 ***
Guilin pgui -44.27 *** -4.70 ** 0.10 *** 0.55 ***
Beihai pbeh -7.90 * -1.95 * 0.24 * 3.22 *
Haikou phai -17.82 *** -2.98 *** 0.16 *** 1.37 ***
Sanya psan -17.63 *** -2.96 *** 0.16 *** 1.39 ***
Chongqing pcho -31.34 *** -3.94 *** 0.12 *** 0.81 ***
Chengdu pche -32.19 *** -4.01 *** 0.12 *** 0.76 ***
Luzhou pluz -10.35 ** -2.27 ** 0.21 ** 2.38 **
Nanchong pnah -11.23 ** -2.34 ** 0.20 ** 2.27 **
Guiyang pguy -12.19 ** -2.46 ** 0.20 ** 2.01 **
Zunyi pzun -22.37 *** -3.34 *** 0.14 *** 1.09 ***
Kunming pkun -15.22 *** -2.75 *** 0.18 ** 1.60 **
Dali pdai -13.72 ** -2.61 *** 0.19 ** 1.78 **
Xi''An pxin -50.99 *** -5.04 *** 0.09 *** 0.48 ***
Lanzhou plan -8.67 ** -2.06 ** 0.23 * 2.89 **
Xining pxii -12.63 ** -2.48 ** 0.19 ** 2.04 **
Yinchuan pyin -21.90 *** -3.30 *** 0.15 *** 1.12 ***
Urumqi puru -11.51 ** -2.33 ** 0.20 ** 2.36 **
18 
 
[Prices of Second-Hand Residential Buildings] 
 
 
  
shrp    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT
Beijing pbei -8.85 ** -1.91 * 0.21 ** 3.46 *
Tianjin ptia -23.20 *** -3.08 *** 0.13 *** 2.09 **
Shijiazhuang pshi -14.11 *** -2.50 ** 0.17 ** 2.31 **
Tangshan ptan -9.82 ** -2.18 ** 0.22 ** 2.60 **
Qinhuangdao pqin -12.84 ** -2.53 ** 0.19 ** 1.90 **
Taiyuan ptai -65.49 *** -5.72 *** 0.08 *** 0.37 ***
Hohhot phoh -11.91 ** -2.43 ** 0.20 ** 2.07 **
Baotou pbao -20.87 *** -3.22 *** 0.15 *** 1.17 ***
Shenyang pshe -17.95 *** -2.97 *** 0.16 *** 1.44 ***
Dalian pdal -13.27 ** -2.57 ** 0.19 ** 1.85 **
Dandong pdan -13.52 ** -2.56 ** 0.18 ** 1.94 **
Jinzhou pjin -7.60 * -1.88 * 0.24 * 3.44 *
Changchun pcha -15.48 *** -2.77 *** 0.17 ** 1.60 ***
Jilin pjil -53.53 *** -5.17 *** 0.09 *** 0.46 ***
Harbin phar -5.92 * -1.65 * 0.27 4.33 *
Mudanjiang pmud -8.64 ** -2.05 ** 0.23 * 2.91 **
Shanghai psha -23.68 *** -3.15 *** 0.13 *** 1.96 **
Nanjing pnan -750.59 *** -19.26 *** 0.02 *** 0.11 ***
Wuxi pwux -10.67 ** -2 16 ** 0.20 ** 2.84 **
Xuzhou pxuz -11.25 ** -2.34 ** 0.20 ** 2.28 **
Yangzhou pyan -71.13 *** -5.94 *** 0.08 *** 0.39 ***
Hangzhou phan -24.49 *** -3.33 *** 0.13 *** 1.52 ***
Ningbo pnin -17.24 *** -2.90 *** 0.16 *** 1.53 ***
Wenzhou pwen -11.35 ** -2.38 ** 0.20 ** 2.15 **
Jinhua pjih -22.24 *** -3.32 *** 0.14 *** 1.13 ***
Hefei phef -170.10 *** -9.04 *** 0.05 *** 0.39 ***
Bengbu pben -3.21 -1.24 0.38 7.58
Anqing panq -16.47 *** -2.85 *** 0.17 *** 1.52 ***
Fuzhou pfuz -9.48 ** -2.13 ** 0.22 ** 2.75 **
Xiamen pxia -28.24 *** -3.64 *** 0.12 *** 1.22 ***
Quanzhou pqua -11.47 ** -2.39 ** 0.20 ** 2.13 **
Nanchang pnac -4.91 -1.56 0.31 4.98
Jiujiang pjiu -3.40 -1.29 0.37 7.18
Ganzhou pgan -22.91 *** -3.28 *** 0.14 *** 1.41 ***
Ji''Nan pjia -63.18 *** -5.44 *** 0.08 *** 0.79 ***
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[Continued] 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC 
 
 
 
shrp    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT
Qingdao pqig -24.50 *** -3.44 *** 0.14 *** 1.16 ***
Yantai pyat -13.19 ** -2.55 ** 0.19 ** 1.89 **
Jining pjii -6.59 * -1.75 * 0.26 * 3.91 *
Zhengzhou pzhe -10.89 ** -1.92 * 0.17 ** 3.72 *
Luoyang pluo -10.03 ** -2.21 ** 0.22 ** 2.52 **
Pingdingshan ppin -18.43 *** -3.02 *** 0.16 *** 1.37 ***
Wuhan pwuh -70.61 *** -5.77 *** 0.08 *** 0.69 ***
Yichang pyic -8.86 ** -2.09 ** 0.23 * 2.80 **
Xiangfan pxig -12.18 ** -2.43 ** 0.20 ** 2.12 **
Changsha pchn -6.76 * -1.83 * 0.27 * 3.62 *
Yueyang pyue -5.81 * -1.65 * 0.28 4.37 *
Changde pchg -19.65 *** -3.12 *** 0.15 *** 1.29 ***
Guangzhou pgua -13.78 ** -2.29 ** 0.16 *** 2.96 **
Shaoguan psho -24.80 *** -3.52 *** 0.14 *** 0.99 ***
Shenzhen pshn -22.62 *** -3.35 *** 0.14 *** 1.12 ***
Zhanjiang pzha -4.72 -1.47 0.31 5.32
Huizhou phui -15.40 *** -2.63 *** 0.17 *** 2.12 **
Nanning pnai -7.22 * -1.89 * 0.26 * 3.42 *
Guilin pgui -15.47 *** -2.76 *** 0.17 ** 1.63 ***
Beihai pbeh -11.01 ** -2.33 ** 0.21 ** 2.25 **
Haikou phai -11.96 ** -2.44 ** 0.20 ** 2.05 **
Sanya psan -9.70 ** -2.19 ** 0.22 ** 2.54 **
Chongqing pcho -24.91 *** -3.52 *** 0.14 *** 0.99 ***
Chengdu pche -8.42 ** -2.05 ** 0.24 * 2.91 **
Luzhou pluz -11.46 ** -2.38 ** 0.20 ** 2.17 **
Nanchong pnah -9.28 ** -2.14 ** 0.23 ** 2.66 **
Guiyang pguy -13.68 ** -2.61 *** 0.19 ** 1.79 **
Zunyi pzun -3.77 -1.29 0.34 6.52
Kunming pkun -8.31 ** -2.00 ** 0.24 * 3.06 **
Dali pdai -17.31 *** -2.94 *** 0.16 *** 1.41 ***
Xi''An pxin -9.34 ** -2.12 ** 0.22 ** 2.76 **
Lanzhou plan -6.21 * -1.71 * 0.27 4.08 *
Xining pxii -4.05 -1.22 0.30 6.24
Yinchuan pyin -40.44 *** -4.49 *** 0.11 *** 0.61 ***
Urumqi puru -16.59 *** -2.79 *** 0.16 *** 1.80 **
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[Gross Regional Products: GRP] 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC 
 
  
grp    MZa    MZt    MSB    MPT
Beijing gbei -16.33 *** -2.84 *** 0.17 *** 1.56 ***
Tianjin gtia -13.85 *** -2.60 *** 0.18 ** 1.86 **
Hebei gheb -10.33 ** -2.26 ** 0.21 ** 2.41 **
Shanxi gsha -14.27 *** -2.64 *** 0.18 ** 1.80 **
Inner Mongolia gmon -6.08 * -1.62 * 0.26 * 4.40 *
Liaoning glia -3.60 -0.50 0.13 *** 6.82
Jilin gjil -8.52 ** -1.95 * 0.22 ** 3.27 *
Heilongjiang ghei -18.37 *** -2.97 *** 0.16 *** 1.54 ***
Shanghai gshn -17.96 *** -2.99 *** 0.16 *** 1.36 ***
Jiangsu gjia -6.72 * -1.78 * 0.26 * 3.79 *
Zhejiang gzhe -7.29 * -1.86 * 0.25 * 3.52 *
Anhui ganh -5.50 -1.60 0.29 4.59
Fujian gfuj -9.07 ** -2.05 ** 0.22 ** 2.97 **
Jiangxi gjin -15.55 *** -2.78 *** 0.17 ** 1.58 ***
Shandong gshd -4.82 -1.41 0.29 5.37
Henan ghen -5.58 -1.65 * 0.29 4.42 *
Hubei ghub -8.51 ** -2.04 ** 0.24 * 2.93 **
Hunan ghun -6.62 * -1.75 * 0.26 * 3.93 *
Guangdong ggua -11.60 ** -2.39 ** 0.20 ** 2.17 **
Guangxi ggun -5.46 -1.58 0.28 4.68
Hainan ghai -15.50 *** -2.76 *** 0.17 ** 1.64 ***
Chongqing gcho -15.95 *** -2.82 *** 0.17 ** 1.54 ***
Sichuan gsic -6.79 * -1.82 * 0.26 * 3.68 *
Guizhou ggui -20.16 *** -3.12 *** 0.15 *** 1.38 ***
Yunnan gyun -13.84 *** -2.62 *** 0.18 ** 1.81 **
Shaanxi gshx -8.65 ** -2.04 ** 0.23 * 2.95 **
Gansu ggan -8.65 ** -2.06 ** 0.23 * 2.87 **
Qinghai gqin -13.54 ** -2.55 ** 0.18 ** 1.97 **
Ningxia gnin -14.06 *** -2.64 *** 0.18 ** 1.76 ***
Xinjiang gxin -16.92 *** -2.87 *** 0.16 *** 1.58 ***
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Table 3 Granger Causality Test on Property Prices 
 
[Prices of Newly Constructed Commercialized Buildings] 
 
  
grp cif mon
Beijing pbei gbei 8.64 *** (negative) 6.05 **
Tianjin ptia gtia 7.38 *** (negative) 10.45 ***
Shijiazhuang pshi gheb 0.21 17.56 ***
Tangshan ptan gheb 0.69 8.89 ***
Qinhuangdao pqin gheb 0.35 21.09 ***
Taiyuan ptai gsha 0.66 0.09
Hohhot phoh gmon 0.78 7.64 ***
Baotou pbao gmon 2.09 3.77 *
Shenyang pshe glia 1.88 3.82 *
Dalian pdal glia 0.18 9.04 ***
Dandong pdan glia 1.35 11.00 ***
Jinzhou pjin glia 0.40 3.64 *
Changchun pcha gjil 0.18 9.58 ***
Jilin pjil gjil 4.72 ** 7.77 ***
Harbin phar ghei 0.43 6.13 **
Mudanjiang pmud ghei 1.12 14.93 ***
Shanghai psha gshn 7.89 *** (negative) 1.71
Nanjing pnan gjia 7.11 *** (negative) 8.54 ***
Wuxi pwux gjia 2.91 * (negative) 8.13 ***
Xuzhou pxuz gjia 0.66 8.32 ***
Yangzhou pyan gjia 1.61 22.27 ***
Hangzhou phan gzhe 1.50 8.42 ***
Ningbo pnin gzhe 2.09 7.42 ***
Wenzhou pwen gzhe 2.14 14.02 ***
Jinhua pjih gzhe 0.00 15.25 ***
Hefei phef ganh - -
Bengbu pben ganh - -
Anqing panq ganh - -
Fuzhou pfuz gfuj 6.74 *** (negative) 7.81 ***
Xiamen pxia gfuj 6.31 ** (negative) 7.10 ***
Quanzhou pqua gfuj 0.79 7.39 ***
Nanchang pnac gjin 1.17 14.54 ***
Jiujiang pjiu gjin 0.07 21.61 ***
Ganzhou pgan gjin 0.14 17.43 ***
Ji''Nan pjia gshd - -
nccp
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[Continued] 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC 
  
grp cif mon
Qingdao pqig gshd - -
Yantai pyat gshd - -
Jining pjii gshd - -
Zhengzhou pzhe ghen 2.71 * (negative) 10.08 ***
Luoyang pluo ghen 0.33 6.37 **
Pingdingshan ppin ghen 0.54 2.84 *
Wuhan pwuh ghub 3.77 * (negative) 13.40 ***
Yichang pyic ghub 0.45 17.77 ***
Xiangfan pxig ghub 0.02 7.07 ***
Changsha pchn ghun 0.08 16.35 ***
Yueyang pyue ghun 0.21 13.22 ***
Changde pchg ghun 2.21 17.55 ***
Guangzhou pgua ggua 4.05 ** (negative) 4,23 **
Shaoguan psho ggua 0.08 8.99 ***
Shenzhen pshn ggua 6.41 ** (negative) 0.06
Zhanjiang pzha ggua 0.03 18.76 ***
Huizhou phui ggua 4.15 ** (negative) 6.61 **
Nanning pnai ggun - -
Guilin pgui ggun - -
Beihai pbeh ggun - -
Haikou phai ghai 0.86 6.93 ***
Sanya psan ghai 0.53 4.34 **
Chongqing pcho gcho 0.00 9.41 ***
Chengdu pche gsic 0.17 6.96 ***
Luzhou pluz gsic 0.01 3.12 *
Nanchong pnah gsic 1.70 3.28 *
Guiyang pguy ggui 0.25 7.15 ***
Zunyi pzun ggui 0.05 9.22 ***
Kunming pkun gyun 2.68 14.42 ***
Dali pdai gyun 0.45 8.37 ***
Xi''An pxin gshx 0.41 13.08 ***
Lanzhou plan ggan 0.00 5.47 **
Xining pxii gqin 0.04 11.85 ***
Yinchuan pyin gnin 0.00 4.87 **
Urumqi puru gxin 0.59 4,24 **
Contributions in Total 1 / 60 57 / 60
nccp
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[Prices of Second-Hand Residential Buildings] 
 
 
  
grp cif mon
Beijing pbei gbei 11.48 *** (negative) 0.07
Tianjin ptia gtia 6.41 ** (negative) 4.34 **
Shijiazhuang pshi gheb 0.54 12.78 ***
Tangshan ptan gheb 1.25 5.78 **
Qinhuangdao pqin gheb 0.00 15.93 ***
Taiyuan ptai gsha 0.14 1.71
Hohhot phoh gmon 0.05 0.04
Baotou pbao gmon 1.34 1.87
Shenyang pshe glia 0.66 5.81 **
Dalian pdal glia 0.19 17.52 ***
Dandong pdan glia 0.08 12.89 ***
Jinzhou pjin glia 0.76 4.76 **
Changchun pcha gjil 0.00 1.01
Jilin pjil gjil 1.70 18.73 ***
Harbin phar ghei 2.33 0.87
Mudanjiang pmud ghei 1.03 6.87 ***
Shanghai psha gshn 8.67 *** (negative) 1.97
Nanjing pnan gjia 2.12 4.18 **
Wuxi pwux gjia 0.03 10.87 ***
Xuzhou pxuz gjia 5.25 ** (negative) 4.71 **
Yangzhou pyan gjia 3.07 * 32.80 ***
Hangzhou phan gzhe 5.48 ** (negative) 11.85 ***
Ningbo pnin gzhe 2.36 1.14
Wenzhou pwen gzhe 5.94 ** (negative) 4.96 **
Jinhua pjih gzhe 0.63 9.54 ***
Hefei phef ganh - -
Bengbu pben ganh - -
Anqing panq ganh - -
Fuzhou pfuz gfuj 5.80 ** (negative) 1.89
Xiamen pxia gfuj 8.98 *** (negative) 7.22 ***
Quanzhou pqua gfuj 0.39 2.86 *
Nanchang pnac gjin - -
Jiujiang pjiu gjin - -
Ganzhou pgan gjin 1.04 10.17 ***
Ji''Nan pjia gshd - -
shrp
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[Continued] 
 
Note: ***, **, * denote the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99%, 95% and 90% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC 
  
grp cif mon
Qingdao pqig gshd - -
Yantai pyat gshd - -
Jining pjii gshd - -
Zhengzhou pzhe ghen 1.81 3.53 *
Luoyang pluo ghen 0.91 9.61 ***
Pingdingshan ppin ghen 1.31 0.64
Wuhan pwuh ghub 3.32 * (negative) 14.78 ***
Yichang pyic ghub 1.05 1.46
Xiangfan pxig ghub 1.40 2.18
Changsha pchn ghun 0.98 6.79 ***
Yueyang pyue ghun 0.37 6.73 ***
Changde pchg ghun 0.97 15.52 ***
Guangzhou pgua ggua 7.56 *** (negative) 1.15
Shaoguan psho ggua 0.97 0.79
Shenzhen pshn ggua 4.17 ** (negative) 0.00
Zhanjiang pzha ggua - -
Huizhou phui ggua 0.97 6.81 ***
Nanning pnai ggun - -
Guilin pgui ggun - -
Beihai pbeh ggun - -
Haikou phai ghai 0.73 6.81 ***
Sanya psan ghai 1.02 2.60
Chongqing pcho gcho 0.68 5.95 **
Chengdu pche gsic 0.49 5.55 **
Luzhou pluz gsic 0.27 2.85 *
Nanchong pnah gsic 0.00 4.15 **
Guiyang pguy ggui 3.23 * 4.31 **
Zunyi pzun ggui - -
Kunming pkun gyun 0.02 1.57
Dali pdai gyun 3.61 * 8.17 ***
Xi''An pxin gshx 0.93 12.22***
Lanzhou plan ggan 0.00 7.09 ***
Xining pxii gqin - -
Yinchuan pyin gnin 2.76 * 4.97 **
Urumqi puru gxin 0.56 2.30
Contributions in Total 4 / 55 37 / 55
shrp
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Table 4 VAR Estimation by Panel Data 
 
Table 4.1 Unit Root Test 
 
Note: *** denotes the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC and PBC 
 
Table 4.2 VAR Estimation 
 
Note: *** denotes the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99% level of significance. The figure in 
parenthesis [ ] indicates t value. 
Sources: NBSC and PBC 
  
Levin, Lin & Chu
Capital Inflows cif -5.16 ***
Money Supply mon -10.20 ***
Prices of Newly Constructed Commercialized Buildings nccp -7.20 ***
Prices of Second-Hand Residential Buildings shrp -3.15 ***
Gross Reginal Product grp -4.84 ***
cif mon nccp
0.506 *** -0.587 *** -0.228 ***
[31.753] [-27.929] [-9.067]
0.109 *** 1.015 *** 0.179 ***
[18.840] [132.206] [19.450]
0.051 *** -0.062 *** 0.864 ***
[7.477] [-6.985] [79.659]
0.074 3.232 *** -1.046 ***
[0.760] [24.971] [-6.741]
0.016 *** -0.042 *** 0.004
[3.014] [-5.968] [0.559]
adj. R^2 0.549 0.875 0.782
cif mon shrp
0.532 *** -0.617 *** -0.193 ***
[34.245] [-30.160] [-8.750]
0.114 *** 1.011 *** 0.127 ***
[19.257] [129.611] [15.213]
0.029 *** -0.041 *** 0.848 ***
[3.899] [-4.199] [79.590]
0.016 3.289 *** -0.738 ***
[0.162] [25.043] [-5.215]
0.016 *** -0.042 *** 0.012
[2.918] [-5.844] [1.546]
adj. R^2 0.542 0.874 0.772
mon -1
shrp -1
C
grp
cif -1
nccp -1
C
grp
mon -1
cif -1
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Table 4.3 Granger Causality Test 
 
Note: *** denotes the rejection of null hypothesis at the 99% level of significance. 
Sources: NBSC and PBC 
 
 
Lags cif mon
Prices of Newly Constructed
Commercialized Buildings
nccp 1 82.22 *** (negative) 378.32 ***
Prices of Second-Hand Residential
Buildings
shrp 1 76 56 *** (negative) 231.46 ***
